To Tame a Chechen Wolf: Shedding the Failing Frame of Salafism; Strategic Insights, v. 7 issue 2 (April 2008) by Fahoum, Keely M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2008-04-01
To Tame a Chechen Wolf: Shedding the
Failing Frame of Salafism; Strategic
Insights, v. 7 issue 2 (April 2008)
Fahoum, Keely M.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 7 issue 2 (April 2008)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11168
  
To Tame a Chechen Wolf: Shedding the Failing Frame of 
Salafism 
by Keely M. Fahoum 
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
 
“They say we’re cowards—let them. We won’t just sit here in Chechnya and be exterminated. I 
warned that we would fight in Russia and there are a lot more targets…if someone spits at you in 
the face for half a year, wouldn’t you spit back just once? That’s what we did and we’ll do it 
again!”[1]  
–Shamil Basayev after raiding Budennovsk in 1995. 
 
“Chechnya is not a subject of Russia, it is a subject of Allah,”  
–Chechen independence slogan. 
  
Introduction  
The Islamist movement in Chechnya has run into a major roadblock. Unable to mobilize 
significant support from the population and fighting a sporadic guerrilla war against the Russians 
has significantly weakened the movement. The Islamist ideology of Jihad for a greater Islamic 
Chechen state is no longer working. The Chechen public is caught between forces vying for 
control of the political space; repressed by the Russian-supported Chechen government (who are 
intermingled with heavy-handed criminal networks) and the Chechen separatist rebels. 
Kidnappings, illegal arrests, torture, rape and other humanitarian abuses have increased parallel 
to the amount of pressure from the Russian government to capture or kill Chechen terrorists. 
While tactically the Islamist Chechen rebels are using guerrilla warfare to combat Russian control 
of their government, theoretically they are stuck in a downward-spiraling movement. But why 
have the rebels been unable to mobilize a large part of the uncommitted Chechen population? 
The answer is quite simple: they have become stuck in their own frame.  
The frame used for the rebel movement in the beginning worked in tandem with the Chechen 
nationalists: Russia was suppressing Chechen independence and denying the population their 
Muslim identity. During the first Chechen war, this frame worked very well and there was little 
conflict between the nationalists and Islamists; however, during the second war, the Islamist 
rebels pulled away from the nationalists and shunned their frame for one crafted specifically for 
non-secular Salafi Muslims. The influx of foreign Mujahadeen fresh from the resistance against 
the Soviet-occupied Afghanistan brought with them money and ideology linked with Salafism. 
Most Chechens were distanced from serious religious study and their focus on Islam during the 
Communist years of the Soviet Union had waned dramatically. They were not familiar with this 
type of Islam and did not see a link between their Chechen identity and that of the Salafists. 
During the second war, the Islamists used frames similar to those used during the resistance in 
Afghanistan, the most prominent being the struggle against the ‘infidel’ Soviet occupiers. 
Although the Islamists wanted independence for Chechnya, the necessary condition for that 
separation, for them, was through a religious trajectory. Chechen Islamists hitched their frame to 
the Salafists’: they claimed that Russia (and in a larger sense, the West) was waging a war of 
aggression against Islam and was responsible for problems in the Muslim world.[2]  
The Islamist movement in Chechnya (since the second war) failed to achieve its primary objective 
because the frame it used for the movement did not resonate with the Chechen population. 
Cultural resonance is the lifeblood of framing strategies and occurs, “when the frames used by 
activists fit within the existing repertoire of legitimate ideological constructions, and then provide 
movements with the cultural resources to dominate public framings of an issue.”[3] A movement 
cannot transform into actual mobilization unless the leaders can find a frame that resonates with 
potential participants.[4] Over time, the Islamist movement in Chechnya lost the legitimacy 
needed to mobilize internal support for the cause. The failure to use language that fell within the 
cultural boundaries of the repertoire contributed to the weakening of the Islamist movement.  
In this paper, I will argue that the reason the Chechen Islamists failed to sustain their movement 
through two regional conflicts lies in the frames they chose. Ineffective framing strategies during 
the second Chechen war mired the Chechen Islamists in a downward-spiraling movement. By 
contrast to the second war, the frames used in the first Chechen war resonated culturally among 
the grassroots populace as legitimate. During the second war, external sources inspired framing 
strategies, overshadowing the previous nationalist frame. The Islamist frame never took sufficient 
root to feed the Islamist movement and change the nature of Chechnya’s fight for independence. 
The framing strategies of the Chechen Islamist rebels failed the independence movement 
because they exceeded the legitimate cultural repertoire[5] and were unable to conform and align 
themselves within the boundaries of indigenous Chechen Islamism.  
In this article I examine the use of framing in the Chechen Islamist movement. Chechens are fond 
of comparing themselves to the wolf, a strong, courageous and adept animal known for its fierce 
and tenacious spirit.[6] In some perspectives, the wolves of Chechnya are fighting a fierce battle 
for their independence. Ineffective framing and poor mobilization tactics hinder the movement 
from its stated goals. In what follows, first I discuss why repression has a connection with 
Chechen mobilization by exploring the frames and framing contest of the Islamist Chechen rebels 
and Chechen government during the first and second wars.[7] Next, I investigate why the framing 
strategies of the rebels failed to mobilize the Chechen public and examine how they have instead 
incapacitated the Islamist movement. While the Islamist and nationalist groups are not the only 
groups operating in the Chechen field, a discussion of the criminal network regulating much of the 
republic is beyond the scope of this article.  
Soviet Repression and Chechen Mobilization Structures  
According to Jack Goldstone, revolutions have two major components, a population motivated to 
rebel, and a state too weak to resist.[8] In the case of Chechnya, decades of repression by the 
Soviet government, a downward spiraling economy and the desire to establish an independent 
state prepared the population to rebel. Brutal coercion by the Soviet government inspired passive 
public support for the resistance. After centuries of repression, there was a desire to, “eradicate 
the humiliation and injustices of the Soviet period.”[9] Prior to the downfall of the communist 
regime, the Soviet Union was considered a strong state. After the overthrow of the communist 
government, Russia’s economy struggled to survive and the state apparatus had to overcome the 
pitfalls of a new democracy. These factors helped to weaken the Russian state and create a 
political opportunity for Chechen mobilization.  
Exclusion and Inclusion  
The conflict between the Russian nation and Chechen separatists began long before 1991. The 
Soviet Union’s role was much like that of an imperial colonizer. Over 300,000 Russians settled in 
Chechnya and the area became little more than a settler-colony over the last two centuries. The 
Chechen nationalist resistance could be characterized as a result of both exclusion and inclusion. 
For example, Chechens were included in the Soviet Union proper, and were forced to adopt 
Communist economic, social and political structures. They were also subject to exclusionary 
policies by being relegated to strictly agricultural and resource processing functions that stunted 
their potential economic growth. The Chechens were also religiously and culturally excluded from 
the rest of ‘white Russia’ and forced to become publicly secular and act as atheists. The 
mountainous lands were ruled as territories directly from Moscow.[10] The North Caucasus’ 
indigenous languages were suppressed and practice of Islam (as well as any other religion) was 
discouraged. Archeologist and ethnic Caucasian Aslan Tov, illustrates the parallel of the Russian 
domination of the North Caucasus to the behavior of colonizers, “the Russians always present 
their conquest of the Caucasus as a good thing, a gift to the people here. They say they brought 
us civilization. But they ignore that we already had our own customs, our own life, and our own 
culture.”[11]  
From Religious Repression to Islamic Revival  
For the Chechens, the early 1990s were a time of Islamic revival. This “reawakening” of the 
Muslim identity occurred in concert with Russia’s glasnost political reforms. New mosques, 
madrassas and Islamic outreach programs began appearing in the region. Sebastian Smith, 
author of Allah’s Mountains who spent several years in the region noted, “many people across the 
region were so ignorant about Islam that this was often less a revival than a rediscovery.”[12] 
Even the village mullah in Adygea, Mohammed Khafitsev recalls the suppression of the Muslim 
faith and his own self-taught struggle for piety,  
“Until 1991, we were not allowed to observe our faith…for 75 years we had no religion. 
One mosque was left, but no one went. Adults still find it uncomfortable to stand and pray 
to God, but now it’s coming back, especially among the children.”[13] 
Muslims were beginning to rediscover their faith and the young were at the helm. Many traveled 
to Turkey or other countries in order to study the Qur’an and learn Arabic. After the 1991 
secession, Muslim teachers from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East began moving 
to the region to teach in universities and to participate in public life.[14] This would introduce the 
Wahabbi ideology to a population that had been detached from their religious roots for a long time. 
The Saudi Arabian teachers represented authority and authenticity of Islam and many of the 
students had no historical routine of the Islamic faith to provide them any alternative to compare it 
to. The fact that these instructors hailed from the sands of Mecca and Medina only added to their 
perceived credibility.  
Religion provides meaning and perspectives on the world using moral systems which enhance 
integrated and ethical societies, but they can also serve to challenge and upset social, political 
and economic systems.[15] During the first and second Chechen war, religion was used as a 
vehicle to legitimize political violence and to challenge a superpower through disruptive means, 
however, it was not enough to supply symbolic and emotional resources needed to sustain the 
movement over time.[16] During the 1990s, Chechnya experienced extensive indiscriminate 
repression which facilitated the politicization of Islam. Mohammed Hafez, author of Why Muslims 
Rebel, argues the result of indiscriminate repression over a significant length of time was the 
radicalization of the Chechen public and the legitimization of violence against Russian forces and 
civilians.[17] Terrorist acts against Russia began almost immediately after the first Russian 
invasion of Grozny. The Islamist rebels have used Russian repression as a way to legitimize their 
violence.  
Dissent among the Wolves and Social Mobilization  
According to social movement scholars Davenport, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, dissent and 
mobilization is largely a result of three factors: political opportunity, mobilizing structures and 
cultural frames.[18] Dissent in this instance was a function of cultural frames of Chechen 
nationalism buttressed by an Islamic identity. Immediately after declaring independence in 1991 
and upon getting wind of the Russian decision to crush the group, protests broke out. As Russian 
troops massed on the borders, Chechens relied on several mobilization structures and cultural 
frames to foster support for their resistance: a freedom to worship as Muslims, a national identity 
separate from Russia, and a reliance on global sympathy for their cause. They would incorporate 
support from foreign fighters called boyeviks from all over the region. Islamic fighters from the 
Ukraine, Baltics, veterans from the Afghan war and ex-Soviet officers flooded into the country. 
The foreign fighters that traveled to defend Chechnya during the first Chechen war were not there 
to promote an Islamic state, but instead by their admiration of the warrior culture and pursuit of 
freedom.[19] Smith states, “Religion played a crucial supporting role to the resistance, although 
this was not by any means a religious war of Moslem versus Christian…most Chechens were 
often quite ignorant, in an academic sense, about their faith.”[20]  
The history of conflict between the two countries, stemming mainly from the Soviet Union’s 
suppression of Chechen identity, faith and culture, has been important in developing the Chechen 
movement. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided a political opportunity and a change in its 
repressive ability which signaled to the Chechen separatists that the time was right to pull away 
from the former Communist regime. Although the separatists recognized the opportunity for 
mobilization against a weakened Soviet state, repression continued against the Islamist rebels 
and eventually against the civilians themselves. Justice was doled out in an inconsistent and 
random manner with tactics including torture, random detention and massacres of alleged rebel 
collaborators. Aside from the uneven application of force, “police harassment against Chechens 
in other parts of the Russian Federation have also increased, with arbitrary identity-checks, 
arrests, and refusals to grant obligatory residency permits in cities such as Moscow.”[21] 
Motivations for this type of activism take hold from years of collective repression, deprivation and 
the prospect of autonomy or independence through a particular political opportunity. Long periods 
of frustration over unmet expectations and a repressive social environment combined with a 
collective perception that the weakening and ultimate collapse of the communist Soviet Union 
provided an opportunity to demand independence and the possibility that this time, the Chechens 
would finally be successful.  
Separatists relied on Islam as a mobilization structure and incorporated frames which used 
religion and nationalism providing a forum for collective organization along lines unique and 
intimate to the Chechen identity. The use of Islam as a mobilization structure was a particularly 
powerful choice because of the non-religious nature of the Communist Soviet regime and the fact 
that religious repression was one of the major grievances of the Chechen people. Religion not 
only provided the mobilization structure, but its symbolic weight was magnified because of the 
very fact that it had been forbidden. Logistically, the mosque provided a social network with pre-
existing social connections as well as communications and command structures. The mosque 
and/or religious networks provided a collective vehicle with which groups of Chechens could 
mobilize for collective action.[22]  
Framing processes must make use of themes familiar and shared among the participants in 
collective action.[23] The Chechen resistance movement was made up of individuals who had 
legitimate grievances against their Soviet oppressors and who collectively shared the optimism 
that organized action could change their circumstances.[24] The framing processes used during 
the first war were an example of frames using a familiar cultural repertoire that incorporated 
themes and concepts shared within the Chechen community. During the first war, the resistance 
movement made use of both religious and nationalistic frames which worked together cohesively 
and helped to propel the collective action against the Soviet forces; however, during the second 
war, the framing processes became competitive against one another and split the movement 
whereby weakening it significantly. The framing processes ceased to be familiar to the Chechen 
population because they were saturated with Salafi rhetoric which did not have a foothold within 
the Chechen cultural repertoire.  
The First Chechen War  
War or Intifada?  
The first Chechen war had many elements in common with the first Palestinian Intifada: mass 
demonstrations against what they perceived to be an occupier, heavy themes of nationalism and 
independence and an open relationship with the western press. Prior to the first Intifada, terror 
was used as an attention-grabbing tactic. Terrorism was used in the first Chechen war to bring 
international attention to their struggle for independence. These acts, comparable to initial 
Palestinian terror attacks proved that the Chechens could no longer be ignored.[25] These 
elements mobilized world attention for the Chechen state and provided a political opportunity for 
international resource mobilization to support a move for independence. Media coverage of the 
first Palestinian Intifada showed children throwing rocks at Israeli tanks, bringing to the world an 
image of David versus Goliath. In general, there was a feeling of sympathy for the Palestinians 
because they were perceived as the ‘underdog.’ Using the tool of emotions, Palestinians were 
able to gain and mobilize significant international support for their cause. Similarly, the Chechens 
were able to work hand-in-glove with Western media outlets and televised humanitarian tragedies 
and an overwhelming conventional gap between the Russians and themselves. In addition, the 
Chechens could claim they were seeking democracy and freedom, buzzwords that would 
inherently incite support from the “good” west versus the “evil” Russia. Although Russia had 
recently moved away from Communist ideologies and encouraged the Caucasus Republics’ 
freedom and autonomy, it almost appeared they went back on their word when they surrounded 
Grozny, the capital of Chechnya and shelled its inhabitants. The nationalist leadership played to 
this disparity in conventional strength and cried out for world support.  
Framing Strategies for the First Chechen War  
Chechen President Dudayev and the leader of the Islamist Chechen Wolves, Shamil Basayev 
used several framing strategies in the first Chechen War to mobilize public support for the conflict. 
The two leaders of Chechnya were not in a competitive or contentious framing contest to win a 
fraction of support. They worked in tandem to mobilize support for the first war and to depict an 
image of the evil, overbearing Russian giant denying the proud Chechens their freedom. Framing 
requires presenting diametrically opposed version of events to support political claims and 
tactics.[26] Quintan Wiktorowicz cites four framing strategies that contribute to framing contests 
within a movement’s struggle for authority: vilification, exaltation, credentialing and de-
credentialing.[27] With respect to the first Chechen war, these four strategies were successful in 
mobilizing popular support for the nationalist resistance against the Soviet Union. The Islamists 
and the government shared the same diagnostic frame: Russia was suppressing Chechen 
independence and denying the population their Muslim identity.  
Vilification  
Dudayev and Basayev were able to depict the Soviet Union as the ultimate villain. Historical 
memory made vilification even easier. Based on historical events, centuries of repression, conflict, 
deportation, genocide, racism and outlawing religious freedom, vilification of Russia as the “other” 
and evil was not a stretch. Russia was seen as a “colonizer” of Chechnya, therefore, the 
nationalist’s desire to separate from Russia was understood as a response to colonialism.  
The phrase, ‘Never again!’ resonated not only among the Chechen victims of Russian genocide 
or deportation, but was a successful frame because the world’s collective memory aligns the 
phrase with the Jewish Holocaust and carries the emotional tag of survival.[28] Dudayev was able 
to use this phrase and mobilize a public relations strategy including publications bolstering the 
Chechen identity and fostering pride in a unique and historic republic effectively polarizing the 
Chechen public into supporters or non-supporters. Dudayev’s mantra was specifically 
nationalistic, but he did not avoid using religious rhetoric when he thought it would behoove the 
cause. Basayev took the lead in the jihad frame and promoted an Islamic state ruled legally under 
shari’a. Name-calling and maligning against Russian non-believers also helped Basayev to rally 
international support for the cause.[29] The amount of international monetary, ideological and 
manpower support added strategic depth to the movement.  
Exaltation  
The framing contest between Dudayev and Basayev during the first Chechen war involved little 
exaltation. It was unnecessary for either man to thrust intelligentsia against each other as they 
were both on the same team. Dudayev already had plenty of fuel to burn with Russian elitism and 
years of marginalization from Russian intellectuals labeling the Chechens as ‘backwater’ and 
uneducated peasants. Dudayev was able to mobilize a public relations strategy including 
publications exalting the Chechen identity and fostering pride in a unique and historic republic 
effectively polarizing the Chechen public into supporters or non-supporters. He was able to 
convince the public that through sacrifice and effort, the dream of an independent Chechnya was 
not unreachable. Basayev’s job was just as easy. Demanding a return to Islam and defending 
oneself from aggression of the ‘infidels’ was an easy sell to international audiences who 
sympathized with the cause, not to mention it seemed a replay of Russian aggression in 
Afghanistan. During the first Chechen war the Islamist rebels used a ‘soft’ sell focusing mostly on 
nationalism and the freedom to worship. This would be much different during the second war 
where violent acts and terror would be marketed in a ‘hard’ sell to more extreme and radical 
Islamist supporters around the world.  
Credentialing  
To mobilize supporters for a cause, the leaders must have character, trustworthiness and credible 
expertise. The leader must establish the authority to speak for their members and to represent 
the movement at large.[30] The more status or perceived knowledge the frame articulator has 
from the point of view of the potential participants, the more the frames will resonate.[31] 
Although trust between Dudayev and the Chechen public was shaky at best, Basayev managed 
to build up credibility through militant acts against the Russian forces. With every defiant act 
against the overwhelming conventional Russian military, Basayev’s credibility would increase. 
Duadayev was good at articulating the nationalistic rhetoric, but Basayev shouldered the 
credibility requirement. Wictorowicz defines three criteria for credibility: the person must be 
knowledgeable; they must have character and be logical.[32] Although Basayev did not have an 
extensive or impressive education, his experience fighting the Russians in the first war lent him 
credibility and respect. His stubborn nature and ability to follow through on promises enhanced 
his character among both the Chechens and his Russian enemies. Whether or not Basayev 
possessed logic would depend on who the question is directed to. The Chechens who fought 
along side Basayev would argue that he was completely logical and his actions would be seen as 
rational. If his opponents decried him as illogical they could at least agree that he was consistent.  
 
De-Credentialing  
It is natural that in any movement, one side would try to discredit and undermine the other. 
Dudayev and Basayev did not intend to discredit each other; in fact, they defended and protected 
each other within their respective spheres of influence. Their efforts focused instead on 
discrediting the Russian invaders. The Russians helped this effort along with each act of 
indiscriminate repression against the Chechen public. Dudayev and his propaganda team used 
historical memory and socio-economic hardships to garner support for the nationalist movement 
in the first war. President Yeltsin added fuel to the fire via his inconsistency in dealing with the 
Chechen republic. He hurt Russia’s credibility by delivering one message to the world audience 
filled with independence rhetoric and then redacted it when his forces invaded Chechnya in order 
to force it to stay in the Russian Federation.  
Although it seemed Dudayev and Basayev were working as a team, with different tactics and 
strategies, but for the same goal, each knew the boundary of the other. Dudayev left the religious 
framing to Basayev and Basayev left most of the nationalism framing strategies to Dudayev. 
There was not a high level of competition between the two and the framing contest was not 
adversarial, but instead, mutually beneficial. They were able to share resources and for at least 
three years, work together for the same cause.  
The Second Chechen War  
The second Chechen war was characterized by four factors: limited amount of journalistic 
coverage, Islamist framing, terrorism and indiscriminate repression by Russian forces. In 2000, 
the Russians captured Grozny, pushed the Chechen militants to the mountains in the south and 
during the next six months, the Chechen rebels regrouped and hit back with ambushes and 
suicide bombs. The Russians lacked the ability to control the republic and attract popular support. 
For the rebels, what had primarily changed was a significant increase in the influence of foreign 
Islamic militants and Salafi rhetoric. Leaders in the Salafi movement saw Chechnya as the next 
battleground for their jihad against the Soviet infidel; for the fighters, it was not about Chechen 
independence, but a continuation of the battle in Afghanistan.  
Islamism would have a much greater role in the second conflict. The rhetoric was eerily similar to 
that of al-Qaeda. One fighter claimed, “Our objective is to raise the word of Allah and establish 
Islamic rule everywhere.”[33] The Chechens would fight the second war for many reasons: the 
president fought for the survival of the republic and to maintain independence, some fighters 
fought for the thrill of it, and others fought for the Islamic rule in the North Caucasus. One rebel 
leader expressed the difference between the first and second Chechen war, “In the first war, we 
fought under the banner of ‘freedom for Chechen independence] or death.’ In this war, we are 
fighting under the banner of Islam.”[34] The attraction for young Chechen males was a sense of 
unity, membership in something with purpose and a lack of employment opportunities.[35] The 
Salafists in Chechnya were reluctant to allow any coverage by the Western press, a tactic used to 
the rebels’ advantage during the first war. Instead, they used Salafi propaganda websites to 
advertise their bloody warfare tactics and to recruit other foreign fighters to the jihad.  
Framing Strategies in the Second Chechen War  
The framing strategies for the first Chechen war centered on nationalism, but were supported by 
the ideology of Islam. The reverse was true for the second war. The Islamists and nationalists did 
not share the same diagnostic frame. Chechen Islamists hitched their frame to the Salafists’: they 
claimed that Russia (and in a larger sense, the West) was waging a war of aggression against 
Islam and was responsible for problems in the Muslim world.[36]  
The second war was the Islamists’ war. Basayev fully bought into the Salafist ideology. Because 
Basayev had the credibility, charisma, character and vision, not to mention his single-minded 
willingness to die for the cause; he was the perfect mouthpiece for the Salafist movement in 
Chechnya.  
One significant difference between the first war and the second war was the tenuous relationship 
between Basayev and the new Chechen president (whom had beaten Basayev in the 1997 
election), Aslan Maskhadov. During the first war, Basayev and President Dudayev worked as a 
team to frame the war as a war for independence for an Islamic Chechnya. The framing contest 
between the two leaders was not competitive in nature, but complimented each other’s efforts. 
The second war was marked by a contentious framing contest between Maskhadov and Basayev. 
The Salafi rhetoric and framing tactics became more intense and overshadowed Maskhadov’s 
calls for independence and freedom. Part of the reason the Salafi frame was more prominent, 
was the prolific internet-based propaganda featuring terrorist attacks on Russian centers. 
Basayev and his Salafist field commander and Saudi national, Ibn al-Khattab were able to cut off 
any extensive western media coverage and the only information flowing out came from their 
propaganda network.  
Vilification  
Little changed in Basayev’s vilification strategy between the first and second war. Old feelings of 
humiliation and resistance between the Chechens and Russians were still alive but had been 
publicly usurped by the Salafi effort to frame the war as a fight against the “infidel” Soviet Union. 
Ibn al-Khattab, a Saudi Arabian national who had migrated to Chechnya to help liaison between 
Salafi fighters and the Islamist Wolves, played heavily on Islam’s success in Afghanistan and 
used Russia’s violent counterterrorist actions in the cities as tactics to show the brutality and 
indiscriminate repression directed at Chechen civilians. The Islamists were able to integrate their 
identities with injustice and agency frames to distinguish them from the “other” Russian 
opponents and bystanders.[37]  
Vilification was also used by Basayev against Maskhadov. Basayev did not respect the president, 
primarily because Maskhadov couldn’t control him. Basayev accused the president of pretending 
to be a Muslim. Maskhadov did not like the Salafi brand of religious fanaticism and continued to 
frame the war as a fight for Chechen independence. He argued that Khattab and the foreign 
fighters were skewing the war to be about their cause and were ultimately jeopardizing the fight 
for an independent state. He used name-calling and vilification strategies to discredit Khattab and 
Basayev.  
Exaltation  
During the second war, Basayev propped up Khattab and other Sunni intellectuals in order to sell 
the Islamist theme. He referred to Khattab as a “lion” and pointed to his more than fourteen years 
of experience fighting in a jihad against the Russians. Saudi Arabian donors had provided funds 
to set up madrassas who preached the Salafi version of Islam and which exalted Wahabbi 
learned scholars. Because Islam had been repressed throughout decades of communist rule, 
Chechens were rediscovering their faith. There was a lack of Sufi scholars that could teach Islam 
from the perspective Chechen culture. There was not much corporate knowledge of Islam, so 
when the teachers and scholars spoke there was a feeling among the younger Chechen men that 
they were the ‘enlightened’ ones. Because many of the scholars who taught in the madrassas 
were from Saudi Arabia, the home of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, added more weight to 
their stature. The young men that joined the movement, joined for reasons similar to other 
Islamist movements: financial, spiritual and emotional incentives.[38]  
Maskhadov struggled with this framing strategy. There were no nationalist heroes to hold up for 
the Chechen public as magnets to entice support (except Basayev) and Maskhadov couldn’t 
muster international sympathy while Khattab and his Salafi cohorts were flashing images of dead 
Russian civilians across the globe. Russian media played up the ‘Chechen terrorist’ frame to rally 
international support to their side and to buffer against humanitarian backlash against their brutal 
repression within the Chechen cities. Maskhadov lost control over the criminal element within the 
country and soon found that there was little he could do except push the frame from the first war: 
nationalism first, Islam second.  
Credentialing  
Basayev used political and social mileage out of the first war to garner trust and to mobilize 
support for the Islamist cause. Some Russian opponents labeled Basayev and his movement as 
radical. Uncompromising denial and rejection of existing reality colors any radical social 
movement, and was definitive in the case of Chechnya. Some researchers assert that a radical is 
not simply just a rebel, but a visionary and an activist.[39] With every act of defiance against the 
Russian government; Basayev played up his role as a visionary and built up status in the minds 
of his followers. He was able to use the frame of Islam to entice support among a segment of the 
Chechen population and more importantly, with foreign fighters. Basayev’s credibility was an 
important factor in both Chechen conflicts, but his efforts resonated more on an external level 
than internal. Over time, Basayev’s credibility grew less and less. The Chechen people were not 
achieving what he promised. There was no security, no stability and more importantly, no 
freedom.  
Maskhadov had the opportunity to gain a great deal of credibility immediately after taking office. If 
he would have cleaned up the corruption within the government, gotten a firm hold on the violent 
entrepreneurs within the country and established a patron-client relationship with the rebel groups 
to ensure control, he would have established a strong level of credibility among the Chechen 
population, not to mention with the Russian government. He failed on all accounts.  
De-Credentialing  
Throughout the second Chechen war, Basayev and Maskhadov made attempts to discredit each 
other. Basayev attacked Maskhadov’s level of commitment to Islam. He pointed out that when 
Maskhadov announced full shari’a law in 1999, he was obligated to relinquish presidential power. 
When he did not resign from his position, Basayev formed a Commander’s Council that opposed 
Makhadov and took the issue to Chechnya’s Supreme Shari’a Court. The court was filled will 
Maskhadov supporters, but they agreed with Basayev’s argument questioning the role of the 
country’s secular parliament. The Shari’a Court suspended the parliament and in response, the 
parliament declared the Shari’a court unconstitutional because it was staffed with presidential 
supporters rather than constitutionally appointed. Basayev’s personal vendetta against 
Maskhadov outweighed his crusade against the secular parliament. In a complete reversal of his 
earlier case, Basayev began bashing the parliament for turning the public’s attention away from 
Maskhadov.[40] Supporters of the president jumped on Basayev for failing to adhere to his 
Islamist party line and used the situation to discredit his cause.  
Why the Islamist Frame Failed  
The Islamist movement in Chechnya has weakened significantly. The framing strategies used by 
Basayev and his Salafi supporters did not resonate with the Chechen population, Basayev lost 
credibility with the public and the framing contest between Basayev and Maskhadov resulted in a 
draw. Neither side provided what the Chechen public really needed, namely security, stability and 
relief from indiscriminate Russian repression. The framing strategies of the Islamists failed the 
Chechen independence movement for two reasons: 1) the frame exceeded the legitimate cultural 
repertoire[41] and 2) lack of diversification of framing strategies.  
The first reason the framing strategies for the Islamists failed rest on the gap between the frame 
and the previous beliefs, life experiences or cultural narratives of the Chechen population.[42] 
There was little consumption of the frames provided by the Islamists. The shift from frame 
alignment to frame resonance on a wide scale never happened. There was a weak relationship 
between the Islamist frame and the Chechen cultural environment. Chechen culture had been 
defined by centuries of foreign occupation, repression of indigenous language, religion and 
tradition. Bringing in Salafism to a culture that did not share the same narrative doomed the 
movement to failure. The Islamists failed to regenerate the frame in a way that would accomplish 
“consensus mobilization.”[43] Chechens could not identify with, nor perpetuate the Salafist frame. 
There was a decrease in participants’ commitment over time because attempts to reassert a 
collective identity failed to resonate with a culturally distinct population.[44] Without shared 
meanings and definitions, there was a gap between organization and action.[45] The Salafist 
frame drew on the basic cultural element of Islam, but did not draw on the indigenous cultural 
symbol, language or identities of the Chechens.[46] It was for this reason that the frame did not 
reverberate with constituents and which crippled mobilization.  
Williams and Kubal assert the “frame-culture relationship can be conceptualized as a process of 
frame producers appropriating elements of the larger culture and using them to pursue their goals 
both regarding the movement and changing aspects of society.”[47] This is precisely where the 
Chechen Islamists failed. They chose the wrong strategies and tactics based on the available 
repertoire of collective actions.[48] The legitimate cultural repertoire for Chechnya would use 
elements of nationalism, pride and would essentially go back to the framing strategy used in the 
first war. Themes of independence and freedom resonated among the population whose cultural 
repertoire consisted of periodic rebellion as a response to decades of Russian repression. The 
Salfist goal of a pan-Islamic world was too broad for consumption by the Chechen public.  
The second reason the Chechen Islamist frame has failed was little diversification of framing 
strategies. A movement can have several different frames swirling around in it. The frame that is 
used is the one which resonates more widely among the population. The Islamists have 
championed one frame and have failed to deviate from it. Narrowing down framing choices limits 
the flexibility of the movement whereby weakening it over time. Ibn al-Khattab’s role as broker 
between al-Qaeda and the Wolves chimed the death knell for the movement.[49] The primary 
reason the movement sustained over some time was Basayev and Khattab’s ability to mobilize 
external resources (fighters, guns and money). Basayev stubbornly clung to his vision of an 
Islamist Chechnya, but in the cultural repertoire of the Salafi tradition. By using the frame too long, 
Basayev lost credibility and the ability to speak for the Chechen independence movement.  
Conclusion  
The Chechen Wolves are still fighting their battle for independence. They are mired in a 
downward-spiraling movement that has been plagued by ineffective framing strategies. The 
frames used in the first Chechen war resonated among the people because they had legitimacy 
in the cultural repertoire. For centuries the Chechens have been struggling for independence from 
foreign rule. Framing war as a struggle for freedom resonated among most, if not all Chechens. 
The framing contest between the Chechen President and the rebel leader was not contentious 
and mutually enhanced the movement for independence. During the second war, framing 
strategies migrated to an external source of inspiration and overshadowed the nationalist frame. 
The nature of the framing contest between the new Chechen president and the same rebel leader 
was competitive and strategic. Salafism failed to resonate with the public and was not flexible 
enough to shift to a frame that would mobilize more support in order to sustain the movement. 
Other factors complicate the pursuit for peace; namely an extensive criminal and violent 
entrepreneurial network, a corrupt government with little legitimacy among the public and 
indiscriminate repression by the Russian military. The only likely option for movement success is 
to shed the frame of Salafism and restructure the Islamist movement to recuperate public support 
using familiar and successful framing strategies of independence, nationalism and religion.  
In 2006, the Wolves’ revered leader, Shamil Basayev was killed by Russian forces in Ingushetia 
and his death was heralded by many Russian anti-terrorism officials as a victory. Russian 
President Vladimir Putin called Basayev’s death, “deserved retribution,” referring to Basayev’s 
participation in the 2004 Beslan school attack and other violent attacks on Russian civilians and 
military units.[50]  
The howls of the Chechen Wolves have quieted for now. Many of the Chechen rebels have been 
absorbed into the national army, and violent outbursts have subsided as prior rebel leader and 
new Chechen president, Ramzan Kadyrov attempts to put Chechnya back together. The country 
still faces threats from elements of violent entrepreneurship and fringe religious groups 
headquartered in neighboring Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The frame of Salafism is all but dead 
now, however, Kadyrov still carries the challenge of blending religion and nationalism while 
repelling Russian oppression and countering or co-opting the various elements of organized 
crime within Chechnya.  
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